How to use the pay contract to encourage executives to implement innovation activities has become an important issue to be solved by the theoretical and practical circles. Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2015, this paper examines the impact of external compensation gap on corporate innovation, and further discusses the contextual effects of executive talent and property rights. The study finds that the external compensation gap of executives has a positive effect on enterprise innovation. Moreover, the higher talent executives possess, the more obvious the external compensation gap will promote the innovation of enterprises. In addition, compared with state-owned enterprises, the external compensation gap of non-state-owned enterprise executives has a more significant effect on corporate innovation. This paper not only expands the economic consequences of the external compensation gap, but also provides inspiration for companies to adjust the compensation structure and encourage executives to promote enterprise innovation.
Introduction
Since the reform and opening up, although the Chinese economy has maintained a relatively rapid growth, the extensive economic development model has preneurship and innovation", and regard innovation driving as the source of development, the way to enrich the people, the policy of fairness and the strategy of strengthening the country. Besides, in the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Jinping Xi once again emphasized the strategic policy of "strengthening the construction of the national innovation system... strengthening support for the innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises" as both an urgent and important part of the overall national economy and a strategic task; throughout the report, the word "innovation" appears as many as 60 times. It can be seen that cultivating and stimulating innovation is of great practical significance, and it is also the top priority of the survival of enterprises.
As we all know, enterprise innovation is a strategic decision centered on "people", and the top management team plays a key role in the planning and implementation of corporate innovation activities. At the same time, corporate innovation activities are also a strategic activity with high risk factors, long durations, and difficult to predict future returns. This will have a greater impact on the reputation and revenue of the top management team, which makes the management unwilling to lead. Also, it will carry out innovative activities with a high degree of risk. Agency Theory points out that the establishment of the interest-related mechanism through the compensation contract can achieve the synergy between management and shareholders. This not only compensates for the risk of executive positions, but also encourages executives to work hard to maximize the interests of shareholders. In view of this, how to design an effective and fair compensation contract, and then stimulate the executive team to implement innovative activities is an important issue that enterprises need to solve. It is worth emphasizing that in addition to the salary level, the external compensation structure 1 (external compensation gap) is also an important part of the compensation contract. This is because the listed company executive compensation contract has obvious reference point effect [2] , which will subconsciously compare with the horizontal company in the horizontal society, and then form a basic judgment on the current salary; and with the continuous im- positive effect on enterprise innovation. Further, this paper examines the contextual effects of executive talent and property rights. The study also finds that the higher executive ability the executives possess, the more obvious the external compensation gap promotes the enterprise innovation. In addition, compared with state-owned enterprises, the external compensation gap of non-state-owned enterprise executives has a more significant effect on enterprise innovation.
The possible research contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) Most of the current research on the executive compensation gap is based on the internal salary gap of corporate executives, and the research on its external compensation gap is relatively insufficient. Moreover, the existing research is mainly limited to the analysis of the performance and executive separation framework to examine the economic consequences of the external compensation gap of the executive team [2] [4], and less on the research of enterprise innovation. Based on this, this paper introduces the research framework of enterprise innovation, focusing on the economic consequences of the external compensation gap, which not only complements the existing salary gap research, but also enriches the research content of enterprise innovation influence factors.
2) The existing research has not reached a consensus on the incentive effectiveness of the external compensation gap of executives [4] [5] [6] . Based on the framework of enterprise innovation, this paper analyzes the situational factors of executive compensation, which helps to clarify external compensation. The logic of the gap and the differences in the integration of previous studies.
3) The research in this paper has reference significance for enterprises to improve salary incentive policies, adjust compensation structure and guide innovation activities.
The research structure of this paper is as follows: the second part is the literature review and research hypothesis; the third part is the research designing; the fourth part is the empirical results and analysis; the fifth part is the research conclusion, research contribution, policy enlightenments and research inadequacies.
Literature Reviewand Research Hypothesis

Literature Review
The executive team is the most scarcely human capital of the company，how to motivate the executive team to work hard and ease the conflict of the agent has always been an important issue both on theoretical and practical circles. Among Short-sighted behavior, which in turn plays a positive role in improving performance and improving performance [9] . Based on the tournament theory, Vieito (2012) believed that expanding compensation between CEO and non-CEO compensation is conducive to improving company performance [10] . Kong et al. (2017) found that the internal pay gap has a positive effect on the innovation output of enterprises, and thus supports the tournament theory. Li et al. (2014) examined the economic consequences of the external compensation gap based on the manager market theory similar to the tournament theory. The study found that the external compensation gap of non-state-owned executives has a positive effect on corporate performance [4] .
At the same time, some scholars believe that the compensation gap will lead to unfair feelings, induce dissatisfaction, and breed negative psychological perceptions of exploitation and oppression, which is not conducive to the sustainable development of enterprises [2] [3]. For example, based on social comparative theory, Carpenter et al. (2004) argues that the compensation gap between CEOs and other executive team members is more likely to trigger dissatisfaction with low-paying executives, leading to a decline in corporate performance [11] . Trevor et al. (2012) pointed out that when executives find that the salary is not up to expectations, it will lead to psychological and unfair feelings, resulting in reduced willingness to cooperate and goal consistency, thereby damaging the organization's innovation activities and performance output [12] . Zhang (2007) found that there is a negative correlation between the compensation gap in China and the future performance of the organization, which supports the behavior theory to a certain extent [13] . Yang and Wang (2014) found that under the cultural tradition of "fairness" in China, the internal compensation gap of the company will induce negative incentives such as negative absenteeism and earnings management. Mei and Zhao (2016) took similar empirical evidence with China's A-share listed companies as samples [14] .
Through the above literature review, we find that the research on the execu- 
Research Hypothesis
External Compensation Gap of Executives and Enterprise Innovation
As the degree of marketization of salaries and the turnover rate of managers continually increase, it is normal for corporate executives to conduct horizontal pay comparisons. Many studies show that the executive compensation contract of listed companies has obvious reference point effect. That is to say, the peer-reviewed salary benchmark is an important reference for the executive compensation process [16] . It is not difficult to speculate that the distance between executive compensation and peers' compensation benchmarks. The external compensation gap will affect the effectiveness of compensation incentives.
Specifically, if the external compensation gap is large, it means that the executive compensation is higher than the top executive compensation level, which in turn will serve as a salary incentive. If the external compensation gap is small, it indicates that the top management gap is lower than the average salary level of the DOI: 10.4236/jss.2018.68022 266 Open Journal of Social Sciences industry. The incentive effect of salary is not only not reflected, but will cause agency problems. In view of this, whether the external compensation gap will affect executive behavior and thus affect corporate innovation activities is an important issue to be addressed in this paper. This paper analyzes the internal relationship between executive compensation gap and corporate innovation activities from the following three levels.
Firstly, based on the manager market theory, in the mature manager market, the reputation mechanism can encourage executives to work hard and improve company performanceas an implicit contract [4] . The executive compensation level is a market equilibrium achieved by both the supply and demand sides after the manager can "bargain" [17] , which will have an important impact on the reputation of the executives. Therefore, senior executives with lower salaries will work hard and be committed to achieving the company's innovation strategy.
First of all, they can accumulate working experience and enhance innovation knowledge to cultivate human capital. Then, they can also accumulate reputation capital to change the weak position of compensation. In addition, in the face of fierce market competition, higher-paying executives will work hard to protect existing positions and high salaries, actively lead and participate in corporate innovation activities, in the hope of achieving corporate performance and personal reputation through innovative activities. It can be seen that increasing the external compensation gap can enhance the competition of executives for existing positions and salaries, thus generating a positive incentive effect, which is of great benefit to corporate innovation activities.
Secondly, based on the theory of social comparison, when executives find that their salaries are significantly lower than those of their peers, that is to say, the external compensation gap is too low. It will produce a kind of "black scorpion" mentality and psychological feelings of exploitation. Based on the imbalance of "paying more and less return", executives may negatively absent from work, ignore team goals, reduce teamwork, and take the initiative to express dissatisfaction [11] [14] . However, as the backbone of corporate innovation activities, executives' negative absenteeism or resignation will seriously undermine the organization's ability to innovate, restrict the enthusiasm of other employees to carry out innovative activities, and even lead to the stranding of innovative activities within the plan. Then, if the executive compensation level is continuously raised, the external compensation gap will increase, which will help reduce the unfairness of the top management due to low salary, thereby alleviating the disruptive effects of the top management team's negative absenteeism and personnel changes on the innovation activities of the enterprise. On the other hand, it helps to improve the sense of identity and satisfaction of the top management team [18] , and then stimulate the enthusiasm and initiative of its leadership and innovation activities so that corporate innovation will be significantly improved.
Thirdly, based on the theory of self-attribution, executives will attribute the excessive external compensation gap to their own ability, and then derive the [19] . Enterprise innovation is a high-risk, long-term investment activity, and overconfident executives tend to prefer risk in behavioral decision-making. They are more adventurous in corporate strategic layout, innovative research and development, and can withstand greater difficulties and risks. That will bring more opportunities for the company, which will help promote the implementation of enterprise innovation projects [20] [21].
Based on the analysis above, this paper believes that raising the external compensation gap can play a role on salary incentives, alleviate the unfair feeling of executives, and also strengthen the psychological perception of executives' overconfidence. Obviously, this will positively affect enterprise innovation activities.
In this regard, this paper proposes the following assumption:
H1: The external compensation gap of executives is significantly positively correlated with enterprise innovation.
Situational Effect of Executive Talent
Based on the managerial signal hypothesis, the real power of executives is difficult to detect and quantify, and market participants need to perceive executive capabilities through company performance or other signals [22] . Many studies have shown that innovation activities can significantly affect business performance [23] . Therefore, leading and conducting innovation activities is an important and effective way for executives to demonstrate their talents to the outside manager market. Based on the manager market theory, the external compensation gap of executives can enhance competition and incentives. Then, in order to demonstrate their own capabilities, executives with higher talents have higher enthusiasm to participate in position and salary competition. At this time, they will work harder, increase innovation investment on a larger scale, and are willing to increase the investment of innovative venture capital. Force and endurance, which will promote the development of corporate innovation activities. On the contrary, if the executives are far lower than the peers' executive compensation, that is to say, the executive compensation gap is too small.
The sense of injustice and oppressed by the high-caliber executives will be stronger, and the salary and talent will be dissatisfied. Emotions will not only lead to the negative completion of top management, reduce teamwork, but also induce the voluntary departure of senior executives, resulting in the invisible loss of valuable and scarce human capital, which will hinder the development and implementation of innovation activities [12] .
Additionally, executives can bring a stronger positive feedback to executive self-importance and self-confidence along with excess compensation levels, which further strengthens executives' overconfidence and over-optimism. The so-called "high-tech daring", high-powered executives, driven by overconfidence, will be more diligent and eager to learn at work. Then more enthusiastic about difficult tasks and overcoming difficulties, and more likely to accept risky innovation projects. These will have a positive impact on corporate innovation.
Based on the above discussion, this paper proposes the following assumption: 
Situational Effect of the Nature of Corporate Property Rights
For enterprises with different property rights, the external compensation gap of executives is not the same. So this paper further examines the situational effects of different property rights. Specifically, due to the lack of sovereignty, inadequate governance structure, and inadequate information environment, state-owned enterprises have relatively weak corporate governance [24] . Moreover, the personnel appointment and dismissal rights of state-owned enterprise executives and the remuneration formulation rights are centralized and centralized to relevant departments of local governments at all levels. The selection and remuneration of state-owned enterprise executives are largely supervised and regulated by the government [25] , which makes state-owned enterprise executives. There are institutional barriers to the development of mobility and compensation. It is not difficult to speculate that the situation of state-owned enterprises will lead to a blurred causal relationship between corporate performance and executive efforts, which greatly weakens the effectiveness of the development of compensation contracts based on executive capacity and business performance. At this time, the external compensation gap will greatly weaken the incentive effectiveness of state-owned enterprise executives so that it will be combined with the characteristics of long innovation cycle and high risk. Executives will be greatly tempted to work hard, actively lead and carry out enterprise innovation activities in order to obtain high salary.
In addition, state-owned enterprise executives not only face salary incentives, but also face promotion incentives at the administrative level. Especially under the influence of Chinese "official standard" traditional culture, political promotion is more important than economic interests to some extent [26] , which will enable state-owned enterprise executives to pay more attention to meet their 
In the formula, operating income (Sales) is the output variable; operating cost (COGS), fixed assets (Fixed), sales and management expenses (SG&A), goodwill (GW), R&D investment (R&D), intangible assets (Intan) for input variables. In addition, in order to eliminate the influence of company-level factors on the ability of executives to measure, based on the model (1) of this paper, the Tobit model can be used to estimate the executives. See model (2) for detail: 
In the formula, MS is the market share, FCFI is the free cash flow indicator, HHI is the Herfindahl index, and Age is the company's establishment time. The residual ε is what is sought. The higher the value, the higher the executive can possess.
4) Property nature (State). The nature of the equity is a dummy variable. If the actual controller of the listed company is a state-owned enterprise of a state institution, institution, state-owned enterprise, or collective enterprise, the State value is 1, otherwise it is 0. 5) Control variables. In addition to the above variables, this paper also controls related variables such as corporate governance and financial characteristics, considering the missing variables leading to missing errors. In addition, this paper further introduces industry dummy variables and year dummy variables to control the impact of industry and year. The specific variable definitions are shown in Table 1 .
Model Designing
In order to verify the impact of executive compensation gap on corporate innovation, this paper builds a model (3), specifically: production and supply (D) and transportation, warehousing and postal (G), only 0.259 and 0.514 respectively. This result further illustrates that there is a big difference in the intensity of innovation investment in different industries. Table 4 reports the results of multiple regression for Hypothesis 1. Model 1 shows the regression results of control variables on corporate innovation inputs. Model 2 shows that the regression coefficient of PGap1 is 0.572 and it reaches a level of significance of 1%. Model 3 shows that the regression coefficient of PGap2 is 0.604, also passing the 1% significance level. It is worthy to emphasize that after considering the external compensation gap, the goodness of fit of multiple regression results is greatly improved, indicating that the external compensation gap is indeed an important factor affecting the innovation investment of enterprises. In summary, the external compensation gap has a positive effect on corporate innovation investment. The reason is that the increase of external compensation can play the incentive role of the compensation contract. It can promote competition among the executives, improve the endurance of the executives to the innovation risk, and thus facilitate the development of enterprise innovation activities. Conversely, if the external compensation gap is too low, it will induce executives' dissatisfaction, which will greatly undermine executive leadership and the willingness to implement corporate innovation. Moreover, raising the compensation gap can strengthen executives' self-confidence, which makes executives more adventurous and brings more opportunities to the business. Undoubtedly, this trait is of great benefit to the company's innovative research and development. Thus, the Hypothesis 1 is verified. Although model 3 R&D takes the value of the next year, there may still be endogenous problems between the external compensation gap of executives and the innovation investment of enterprises. Firstly, the result of corporate vation activities do not meet shareholder expectations. It will result in lower executive compensation levels than peers, resulting in a decrease in external compensation. It can be seen that the external compensation gap and corporate innovation activities are mutually causal and have endogenous problems. Secondly, in model 3, although the financial characteristic variables and corporate governance variables affecting the innovation investment of enterprises have been controlled as much as possible, there are still some variables that are difficult to measure and cannot be observed. At this time, missing the bias of the variables will also lead to deviations in the empirical results to some extent. In view of this, this paper selects the mean value of the compensation gap in the same region (the difference between executive compensation and the enterprises in the same region) as the instrumental variable for multiple regression. There are two reasons why this variable is selected as a tool variable: one of them is that when the board of directors sets the salary level for senior executives. It will not only consider the salary status of the senior executives, but also the existing salary levels in the same region. After all, the economic development and consumption levels of different regions are quite different. Therefore, the profile of the pay gap in the same region will naturally affect the pay gap of the sample company executives. The second reason is that the compensation gap in the same region does not affect the innovation investment activities of the sample companies. It can be seen that this variable can meet the requirements of instrument variable correlation and exogenous. It can be also seen that this variable can meet the requirements of instrument variable correlation and exogenous.
Empirical Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
Analysis of Regression Results
In order to further verify the validity of the instrumental variables, this paper performs a number of tests on the instrumental variables. The specific results are shown in Table 3 self-confidence. At this point, they will be more enthusiastic about innovation activities and increase their tolerance for innovation risks. In addition, outstanding executives will be more sensitive to unfair pay, and low external pay gaps will lead to more psychological dissatisfaction, which is not conducive to corporate innovation. It is not difficult to predict that the higher the executive ability, the more obvious the external salary gap will promote the innovation investment. Thus, hypothesis 2 is verified. enterprise executives and innovation investment will be weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises. This is due to the non-market-oriented executive selection, salary control and the pursuit of political promotion by state-owned enterprises, which has led to the sensitivity of state-owned executives to external compensation gap. At this time, the enthusiasm of state-owned enterprise executives to lead and carry out innovation activities based on external compensation gap will be reduced, which will lead to the impact of external compensation gap on innovation investment is lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises.
Thus, hypothesis 3 is verified.
Robustness Test
In order to ensure the reliability of the research conclusions, a number of robustness tests are carried out. 2 Firstly, the company's development of compensation contracts may not be random. Those individual characteristics of the company will affect the external compensation gap, which in turn affects the company's innovation investment and that may lead to missing variables and endogenous problems. In this regard, this paper uses the company's fixed effect regression method to test. The results showed that the regression coefficients of [29] , using the ratio of the increment of intangible assets to the total assets at the beginning of the period to measure the innovation investment of enterprises, and re-testing, the empirical results are not significantly different. In general, the conclusions of this paper are robust and reliable. 
Research Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
As China's economic development enters the "new normal" period, enterprise technology innovation has become the main source of enterprises to enhance their core competitiveness and promote sustainable growth. In view of the high risk factor of enterprise innovation, how to construct a reasonable salary structure to promote executive leadership and implement innovation activities is an important issue to be solved by enterprises. In this regard, this paper takes the data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company from 2006 to 2015 as a research sample, and systematically studies the relationship between external compensation gap and enterprise innovation with its internal mechanism. The study found that the external compensation gap is significantly positively related to corporate innovation and that stimulating external compensation gap can promote enterprise innovation. Further, the executive team can be more outstanding, and the external compensation gap is more obvious to the promotion of enterprise innovation. In addition, there is a difference in property rights between the external compensation gap and the impact of corporate innovation and that the promotion role of state-owned enterprises is weaker than that of non-state-owned enterprises.
Based on the above research, this paper may have the following marginal contributions: Firstly, most of the current research on the external compensation gap executives is based on the internal compensation gap of corporate executives, and the research on its external compensation gap is relatively insufficient.
Moreover, the existing research is mainly limited to the analysis of the performance and executive separation framework to examine the economic consequences of the external compensation gap of the executive teams [2] [4], and less on the research of enterprise innovation. Based on this, this paper introduces the research framework of enterprise innovation, focusing on the economic consequences of the external compensation gap, which not only complements the existing compensation gap research, but also enriches the research content of enterprise innovation influence factors. Secondly, the existing research has not reached a consensus on the incentive effectiveness of the external compensation gap of executives [4] [5] [6] . Based on the framework of enterprise innovation, this paper analyzes the situational factors of executive compensation, which helps to clarify external compensation. The logic of the gap and the differences in the integration of previous studies. Thirdly, the research in this paper has reference significance for enterprises to improve compensation incentive policies, adjust compensation structure and guide innovation activities.
The conclusions of this paper have certain inspirational significance as follows:
1) When formulating and adjusting the compensation contract, the enterprises must consider the factors such as the performance of the executives, and also consider the impact of the peers' compensation benchmarks. If the external compensation structure of the company is too low, it will lead the executives to
